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Reinforcement learning in multiagent systems has been studied in the fields of economic game
theory, artificial intelligence and statistical physics by developing an analytical understanding of
the learning dynamics (often in relation to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory).
However, the majority of these analytical studies focuses on repeated normal form games, which
only have a single environmental state. Environmental dynamics, i.e., changes in the state of an
environment affecting the agents’ payoffs has received less attention, lacking a universal method to
obtain deterministic equations from established multistate reinforcement learning algorithms.
In this work we present a novel methodological extension, separating the interaction from the
adaptation time scale, to derive the deterministic limit of a general class of reinforcement learning
algorithms, called temporal difference learning. This form of learning is equipped to function in
more realistic multistate environments by using the estimated value of future environmental states
to adapt the agent’s behavior. We demonstrate the potential of our method with the three well
established learning algorithms Q learning, SARSA learning and Actor-Critic learning. Illustra-
tions of their dynamics on two multiagent, multistate environments reveal a wide range of different
dynamical regimes, such as convergence to fixed points, limit cycles, and even deterministic chaos.
I. INTRODUCTION
Individual learning through reinforcements is a central
approach in the fields of artificial intelligence [1–3], neu-
roscience [4, 5], learning in games [6] and behavioral game
theory [7–10], thereby offering a general purpose princi-
ple to either solve complex problems or explain behavior.
Also in the fields of complexity economics [11, 12] and so-
cial science [13], reinforcement learning has been used as
a model for human behavior to study social dilemmas.
However, there is a need for improved understand-
ing and better qualitative insight into the characteris-
tic dynamics that different learning algorithms produce.
Therefore, reinforcement learning has also been studied
from a dynamical systems perspective. In their seminal
work, Bo¨rgers and Sarin showed that one of the most ba-
sic reinforcement learning update schemes, Cross learn-
ing [14], converges to the replicator dynamics of evolu-
tionary games theory in the continuous time limit [15].
This has led to at least two, presumably nonoverlapping
research communities, one from statistical physics [16–26]
and one from computer science machine learning [27–35].
Thus, Sato and Crutchfield [18] and Tuyls et al. [27] inde-
pendently deduced identical learning equations in 2003.
The statistical physics articles usually consider the de-
terministic limit of the stochastic learning equations, as-
suming infinitely many interactions between the agents
before an adaptation of behavior occurs. This limit can
either be performed in continuous time with differen-
tial equations [17–19] or discrete time with difference
∗ barfuss@pik-potsdam.de
equations [20–22]. The differences between both vari-
ants can be significant [21, 23]. Deterministic chaos was
found to emerge when learning simple [17] as well as
complicated games [25]. Relaxing the assumption of in-
finitely many interactions between behavior updates re-
vealed that noise can change the attractor of the learning
dynamics significantly, e.g., by noise-induced oscillations
[20, 21].
However, these statistical physics studies so far consid-
ered only repeated normal form games. These are games
where the payoff depends solely on the set of current ac-
tions, typically encoded in the entries of a payoff matrix
(for the typical case of two players). Receiving payoff
and choosing another set of joint actions is performed
repeatedly. This setup lacks the possibility to study
dynamically changing environments and their interplay
with multiple agents. In those systems, rewards depend
not only on the joint action of agents but also on the
states of the environment. Environmental state changes
may occur probabilistically and depend also on joint ac-
tions and the current state. Such a setting is also known
as a Markov game or stochastic game [36, 37]. Thus, a
repeated normal form game is a special case of a stochas-
tic game with only one environmental state. Notably,
Akiyama and Kaneko [38, 39] did emphasize the impor-
tance of a dynamically changing environment; however
did not utilize a reinforcement learning update scheme.
The computer science machine-learning community
dealing with reinforcement learning as a dynamical sys-
tem (see Ref. [28] for an overview) particularly empha-
sizes the link between evolutionary game theory and mul-
tiagent reinforcement learning as a well grounded theo-
retical framework for the latter [28–31]. This dynamical
systems perspective is proposed as a way to gain quali-
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2tative insights about the variety of multiagent reinforce-
ment learning algorithms (see Ref. [2] for a review). Con-
sequently, this literature developed a focus on the trans-
lation of established reinforcement learning algorithms to
a dynamical systems description, as well as the develop-
ment of new algorithms based on insights of a dynamical
systems perspective. While there is more work on state-
less games (e.g., Q learning [27] and frequency-adjusted
multiagent Q learning [32]), multiagent learning dynam-
ics for multistate environments have been developed as
well, such as piecewise replicator dynamics [34], state-
coupled replicator dynamics [33] or reverse engineering
state-coupled replicator dynamics [35].
Both communities, statistical physics and machine
learning, share the interest in better qualitative insights
into multiagent learning dynamics. While the statistical
physics community focuses more on dynamical proper-
ties the same set of learning equations can produce, it
leaves a research gap of learning equations capable of
handling multiple environmental states. The machine-
learning community, on the other hand, aims more to-
ward algorithm development, but so far has put their
focus less on a dynamical systems understanding. Taken
together, there is the challenge of developing a dynam-
ical systems theory of multiagent learning dynamics in
varying environmental states.
With this work, we aim to contribute to such a dynam-
ical systems theory of multiagent learning dynamics. We
present a novel methodological extension for obtaining
the deterministic limit of multistate temporal difference
reinforcement learning. In essence, it consists of formu-
lating the temporal difference error for batch learning,
and sending the batch size to infinity. We showcase our
approach with the three prominent learning variants of
Q learning, SARSA learning and Actor-Critic learning.
Illustrations of their learning dynamics reveal multiple
different dynamical regimes, such as fixed points, peri-
odic orbits, and deterministic chaos.
In Sec. II we introduce the necessary background and
notation. Section III presents our method to obtain the
deterministic limit of temporal difference reinforcement
learning and demonstrates it for multistate Q learning,
SARSA learning and Actor-Critic learning. We illustrate
their learning dynamics for two previously utilized two-
agents two-actions two-states environments in Sec. IV.
In Sec. V we conclude with a discussion of our work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the components (including notation) of
our multiagent environment systems (see Fig. 1), fol-
lowed by a brief introduction of temporal difference rein-
forcement learning.
A. Multiagent Markov environments
A multiagent Markov environment (also called stochas-
tic game or Markov game) consists of N ∈ N agents. The
environment can exist in Z ∈ N states S = {S1, . . . , SZ}.
In each state each agent has M ∈ N available actions
Ai = {Ai1, . . . , AiM}, i = 1, . . . , N to choose from. Hav-
ing an identical number of actions for all states and all
agents is notational convenience, no significant restric-
tion. A joint action of all agents is referred to by a ∈ A =
A1×· · ·×AN , the joint action of all agents but agent i is
denoted by a−i ∈ A−i = A1×· · ·×Ai−1×Ai+1×· · ·×AN .
Environmental dynamics are given by the probabilities
for state changes expressed as a transition tensor T ∈
[0, 1]Z×M×...(N times)···×M×Z . The entry Tsas′ denotes the
probability P (s′|s,a) that the environment transitions to
state s′ given the environment was in state s and the
agents have chosen the joint action a. Hence, for all s,a,∑
s′ Tsas′ = 1 must hold. The assumption that the next
state only depends on the current state and joint action
makes our system Markovian. We here restrict ourselves
to ergodic environments without absorbing states (c.f.
Ref. [35]).
The rewards receivable by the agents are given by the
reward tensor R ∈ RN×Z×M×...(N times)···×M×Z . The en-
try Risas′ denotes the reward agent i receives when the
environment transits from state s to state s′ under the
joint action a. Rewards are also called payoffs from a
game theoretic perspective.
Agents draw their actions from their behavior profile
X ∈ [0, 1]N×Z×M . The entry Xisa = P (a | i, s) denotes
the probability that agent i chooses action a in state s.
Thus, for all i and all s,
∑
aX
i
sa = 1 must hold. We
here focus on the case of independent agents, able to
fully observe the current state of the environment. With
correlated behavior (see e.g., Ref. [2]) and partially ob-
servable environments [40, 41] one could extend the mul-
tiagent environment systems to be even more general.
Note that what we call behavior profile is usually termed
policy from a machine-learning perspective or behavioral
strategy from a game theoretic perspective. We chose
to introduce our own term because policies and strate-
gies suggest a deliberate choice which we do not want to
impose.
B. Averaging out behavior and environment
We define a notational convention, that allows a sys-
tematic averaging over the current behavior profile X and
the environmental transitions T. It will be used through-
out the paper.
Averaging over the whole behavioral profile yields
X〈◦〉 :=
∑
a
Xsa · ◦
:=
∑
a1∈A1
· · ·
∑
aN∈AN
X1sa1 · · ·XNsaN · ◦. (1)
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FIG. 1: Multiagent Markov environment (also known as stochastic or Markov game). N agents choose a joint
action a = (a1, . . . , aN ) from their action sets Ai, based on the current state of the environment s, according to their
behavior profile Xisa = P (a|i, s). This will change the state of the environment from s to s′ with probability Tsas′ ,
and provide each agent with a reward Risas′ .
Here, ◦ serves as a placeholder. If the quantity to be
inserted for ◦ depends on the summation indices, then
those indices will be summed over as well. If the quantity,
which is averaged out, is used in tensor form, then it is
written in bold. If not, then remaining indices are added
after the right angle bracket.
Averaging over the behavioral profile of the other
agents, keeping the action of agent i, yields
X−i〈◦〉 :=
∑
a−i
X−isa−i · ◦
:=
∑
a1∈A1
· · ·
∑
aN∈AN︸ ︷︷ ︸
excl. i
X1sa1 · · ·XNsaN︸ ︷︷ ︸
excl. i
· ◦ . (2)
Last, averaging over the subsequent state s′ yields
T〈◦〉 :=
∑
s′
Tsas′ · ◦ :=
∑
s′∈S
Tsa1...aNs′ · ◦. (3)
Of course, these operations may also be combined as
TX〈◦〉 and TX−i〈◦〉 by multiplying both summations.
For example, given a behavior profile X, the resulting
effective Markov Chain transition matrix reads X〈T 〉ss′ ,
which encodes the transition probabilities from state s
to s′. From X〈T 〉ss′ the stationary distribution of envi-
ronmental states σ(X) can be computed. σ(X) is the
eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 of X〈T 〉ss′ .
Its entries encode the ratios of the average durations the
agents find themselves in the respective environmental
states.
The average reward agent i receives from state s under
action a, given all other agents follow the behavior profile
X reads
TX−i〈R〉
i
sa. Including agent i’s behavior profile
gives the average reward it receives from state s: TX〈R〉is.
Hence, TX〈R〉is =
∑
aX
i
sa · TX−i〈R〉
i
sa holds.
C. Agent’s preferences and values
Typically, agents are assumed to maximize their expo-
nentially discounted sum of future rewards, called return
Gi(t) = (1 − γi)∑∞k=0(γi)kri(t + k), where γi ∈ [0, 1) is
the discount factor of agent i and ri(t + k) denotes the
reward received by agent i at time step t + k. Expo-
nential discounting is most commonly used for its math-
ematical convenience and because it ensures consistent
preferences over time. Other formulations of a return
use e.g., finite-time horizons, average reward settings, as
well as other ways of discounting, such as hyperbolic dis-
counting. Those other forms require their own form of
reinforcement learning.
Given a behavior profile X, the expected return defines
the state-value function V is (X) := TX
〈
Gi(t) | s(t) = s〉i
s
which is independent of time t. The operation
TX〈. . . | s(t) = s〉 denotes the behavioral and environ-
mental average as defined in Eqs. 1 and 3 given that
in the current time step t the environment is in state s.
Inserting the return yields the Bellman equation [42],
V is (X) =
TX
〈
(1− γi)ri(t) + γiV is(t+1)(X) | s(t) = s
〉
i
s.
(4)
This recursive relationship between state values de-
clares that the value of a state s is the discounted value
of the subsequent state s(t+1) plus (1−γi) times the re-
ward received along the way. Evaluating the behavioral
and environmental average TX〈 〉 and writing in matrix
form we get:
Vi(X) = (1− γi) · TX〈R〉i + γi · X〈T〉 ·Vi(X). (5)
The reward ri(t) received at time step t is evaluated to
reward TX〈R〉is for state s, since the behavioral and en-
vironmental average was conditioned on starting in state
s(t) = s. The average subsequent state value V is(t+1)(X)
4from the current state s can be expressed as a matrix
multiplication of the effective Markov transition matrix
and the vector of state values:
∑
s′ X〈T 〉ss′ ·Vis′(X).
A solution of the state values Vi(X) can be obtained
using matrix inversion
Vi(X) = (1− γi) (1Z − γi X〈T〉)−1 TX〈R〉i . (6)
The computational complexity of matrix inversion makes
this solution strategy infeasible for large systems. There-
fore many iterative solution methods exist [3].
Equivalently, state-action-value functions Qisa are de-
fined as the expected return, given agent i applied action
a in state s and then followed X accordingly: Qisa(X) :=
TX
〈
Gi(t) | s(t) = s, a(t) = a〉isa. Even though this is the
behavioral average over the whole behavioral profile, the
resulting object carries an action index because the oper-
ation is conditioned on the current action to be a(t) = a.
They can be computed via
Qisa(X) = (1− γi)TX−i〈R〉
i
sa + γ
i
∑
s′
X〈T 〉ss′ · V is′(X).
(7)
One can show that V is (X) =
∑
aX
i
saQ
i
sa(X) holds for
the inverse relation of state-action and state values.
D. Learning through reinforcement
In contrast to the typical game-theoretic assumption of
perfect information, we assume that agents know nothing
about the game in advance. They can only gain infor-
mation about the environment and other agents through
interactions. They do not know the true reward tensor
R or the true transition probabilities Tsas′ . They experi-
ence only reinforcements (i.e., particular rewards Risas′),
while observing the current true Markov state of the en-
vironment.
In essence, reinforcement learning consists of iterative
behavior changes toward a behavior profile with maxi-
mum state values. However, due to the agents’ limited in-
formation about the environment, they generally cannot
compute a behavior profile’s true state- and state-action
values, V is (X) and Q
i
sa(X), as defined in the previous sec-
tion. Therefore, agents use time-dependent state-value
and state-action-value approximations, V˜ is (t) and Q˜
i
sa(t),
during the reinforcement learning process.
1. Temporal difference learning
Basically, state-action-value approximations Q˜isa get
iteratively updated by a temporal difference error
TDisa(t):
Q˜isa(t+ 1) = Q˜
i
sa(t) + α
iTDisa(t), (8)
with αi ∈ (0, 1) being the learning rate of agent i. These
state-action propensities Q˜isa can be interpreted as esti-
mates of the state-action values Qisa.
The temporal difference error expresses a difference in
the estimation of state-action values. New experience is
used to compute a new estimate of the current state-
action value and corrected by the old estimate. The esti-
mate from the new experience uses exactly the recursive
relation of value functions from the Bellmann equation
(Eq. 4),
TDisa(t) = δss(t)δaa(t)·[
(1− γi)Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) + γi gis(t+1) (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
estimate from new experience
− gis(t)(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
old estimate
]
. (9)
Here s and a denote the state-action pair whose tempo-
ral difference error is calculated. With s(t), a(t), etc. we
refer to the state, action, etc. that occurred at time step
t. Thus, the notation Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) refers to the
entry of the reward tensor Risaa−is′ when at time step t
the environmental state was s [s(t) = s], agent i chose
action a [a(t) = a], the other agents chose the joint ac-
tion a−i [a−i(t) = a−i] and the next environmental state
was s′ [s(t+ 1) = s′]. The gis(t+1)(t) indicates the state-
value estimate at time step t of the state visited at the
next time step s(t + 1). gis(t)(t) denotes the state-value
estimate at time step t of the current state s(t). Differ-
ent choices for these estimations are possible, leading to
different learning variants (see below).
The Kronecker deltas δss(t), δaa(t) indicate that the
temporal difference error for state-action pair (s, a) is
only nonzero when (s, a) was actually visited in time
step t. This denotes and emphasizes that agents can
only learn from experience. In contrast, e.g., experience-
weighted-attraction learning [9] assumes that action
propensities can be updated with hypothetical rewards
an agent would have received if they had played a dif-
ferent action than the current action. These two cases
have been referred to as full vs. partial information [16].
Thus, the Kronecker deltas in Eq. 9 indicate a partial
information update. The agents use only information
experienced through interaction.
The state-action-value approximations Q˜isa are trans-
lated to a behavior profile according to the Gibbs-
Boltzmann distribution [1] (also called softmax)
Xisa(t) =
exp(βiQ˜isa(t))∑
b exp(β
iQ˜isb(t))
. (10)
The behavior profile X becomes a dynamic variable
as well. The parameter βi controls the intensity of
choice or the exploitation level of agent i controlling the
5exploration-exploitation trade-off. In analogy to statisti-
cal physics, βi is the inverse temperature. For high βi
agents tend to exploit their learned knowledge about the
environment, leaning toward actions with high estimated
state-action value. For low βi, agents are more likely to
deviate from these high value actions in order to explore
the environment further with the chance of finding ac-
tions, which eventually lead to even higher values. Other
behavior profile translations exist as well (e.g., -greedy
[1]).
2. Three learning variants
The specific choices of the value estimates g in the
temporal difference error result in different reinforcement
learning variants.
a. Q learning. For the Q learning algorithm [1, 3],
gis(t+1)(t) = maxb Q˜is(t+1)b(t) and gis(t)(t) = Q˜is(t)a(t)(t).
Thus, the Q learning update takes the maximum of the
next state-action-value approximations as an estimate for
the next state value, regardless of the actual next action
the agent plays. This is reasonable because the maxi-
mum is the highest value achievable given the current
knowledge. For the state-value estimate of the current
state, the Q learner takes the current state-action-value
approximation Qis(t)a(t)(t). This is reasonable because it
is exactly the quantity that gets updated by Eq. 8.
b. SARSA learning. For SARSA learning [1, 3],
gis(t+1)(t) = Q˜is(t+1)a(t+1)(t) and gis(t)(t) = Q˜is(t)a(t)(t),
where a(t+ 1) denotes the action taken by agent i at the
next time step a(t + 1) = Ai(t + 1). Thus, the SARSA
algorithm uses the five ingredients of an update sequence
of State, Action, Reward, next State, next Action to per-
form one update. In practice, the SARSA sequence has
to be shifted one time step backward to know what the
actual ”next” action of the agent was.
c. Actor-Critic (AC) learning. For AC learning [1,
3], gis(t+1)(t) = V˜ is(t+1)(t) and gis(t)(t) = V˜ is(t)(t). Com-
pared to Q and SARSA learners, it has an additional data
structure of state-value approximations which get sepa-
rately updated according to V˜ is (t+1) = V˜
i
s (t)+α
i·Disa(t).
The state-action-value approximations Q˜isa serve as the
actor which gets criticized by the state-value approxima-
tions V˜ is .
Tab. Ia summarizes the values estimates g for these
three learning variants. Q and SARSA learning are
structurally more similar compared to the Actor-Critic
learner, which uses an additional data structure of state-
value approximations V˜ is .
III. DETERMINISTIC LIMIT
So far we gave a brief introduction to temporal dif-
ference reinforcement learning. A more comprehensive
presentation can be found in Ref. [1]. In this section
we will present a novel extension to the methodology of
interaction-adaptation timescales separation to the gen-
eral class of temporal difference reinforcement learning.
In summary, we (i) give a batch formulation of the tempo-
ral difference error, (ii) separate the timescales of interac-
tion and adaptation by sending the batch size to infinity
and (iii) present a resulting deterministic limit conver-
sion rule for discrete time updates. We showcase our
method in the three learning variants of Q, SARSA and
Actor-Critic learning. For the statistical physics com-
munity, the novelty consists of learning equations, ca-
pable of handling environmental state transitions. For
the machine learning community the novelty lies in the
systematic methodology we use to obtain the determin-
istic learning equations. Note that these deterministic
learning equations will not depend on the state-value or
state-action-value approximations anymore, being iter-
ated maps of the behavior profile alone.
Following e.g., Refs. [18, 19, 22], we first combine Eqs.
8 and 10 and obtain
Xisa(t+ 1) =
Xisa(t) exp
(
αiβiTDisa(t)
)
∑
bX
i
sb(t) exp
(
αiβiTDisb(t)
) . (11)
Although it appears that only the product αiβi matters
for a behavior profile update, the temporal difference er-
ror TDisa may depend only on the exploitation level β
i,
as we will show below.
Next, we formulate the temporal difference error for
batch learning.
A. Batch learning
With batch learning we mean that several time steps
of interaction with the environment and the other agents
take place before an update of the state-action-value ap-
proximations and the behavior profile occurs. It has also
been interpreted as a form of history replay [43] which is
essential to stabilize the learning process when function
approximation (e.g., by deep neural networks) is used
[44]. History (i.e., already experienced state, action, next
state triples) is used again for an update of the state-
action-value approximations.
Imagine that the information from these interactions
are stored inside a batch of size K ∈ N. We introduce
the corresponding temporal difference error of batch size
K:
TDisa(t;K) :=
1
K(s, a)
K−1∑
k=0
[
δss(t+k)δaa(t+k)
·
(
(1− γi)Ris(t+k)a(t+k)a−i(t+k)s(t+k+1)
+ γi gis(t+k+1) (t)−gis(t)(t)
)]
(12)
6Q learning
SARSA learning
Actor Critic (AC) learning
gis(t+1)(t) gis(t)(t)
maxb Q˜
i
s(t+1)b(t) Q˜
i
s(t)a(t)(t)
Q˜is(t+1)a(t+1)(t) Q˜
i
s(t)a(t)(t)
V˜ is(t+1)(t) V˜
i
s(t)(t)
(a) K = 1
gis(t+1)(t) gis(t)(t)
maxQisa(X) 1βi logXisa(t)
nextVisa(X) 1βi logXisa(t)
nextVisa(X) /
(b) K = ∞
TABLE I: Overview of the three reinforcement learning variants. Shown in the columns are the value estimates for
the next state gis(t+1)(t) and the current state gis(t)(t) for both ends of the batch size spectrum: K = 1 and K =∞.
where K(s, a) = max(1,
∑K−1
k=0 δss(t+k)δaa(t+k)) denotes
the number of times the state-action pair (s, a) was vis-
ited. If the state-action pair (s, a) was never visited, then
K(s, a) = 1. The agents interact K times under the same
behavior profile and use the sample average to summarize
the new experience in order to update the state-action-
value approximations:
Q˜isa(t+K) = Q˜
i
sa(t) + α
iTDisa(t;K). (13)
The notation TDisa(t) denotes a batch update of batch
size 1: TDisa(t) = TD
i
sa(t; 1).
B. Separation of timescales
We obtain the deterministic limit of the temporal dif-
ference learning dynamics by sending the batch size to
infinity, K → ∞. Equivalently, this can be regarded
as a separation of timescales. Two processes can be dis-
tinguished during an update of the state-action-value ap-
proximations ∆Q˜isa(t) := Q˜
i
sa(t+1)−Q˜isa(t): adaptation
and interaction,
∆Q˜isa(t) = α
iδss(t)δaa(t)·
adaptation︷ ︸︸ ︷(
(1− γi)Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) + γi gis(t+1) (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interaction
−gis(t) (t)
)
(14)
By separating the timescales of both processes, we as-
sume that (infinitely) many interactions happen before
one step of behavior profile adaptation occurs.
Under this assumption and because of the assumed er-
godicity one can replace the sample average, i.e., the sum
over sequences of states and actions with the behavior
profile average, i.e., the sum over state-action behavior
and transition probabilities according to
1
K(s, a)
K−1∑
k=0
δss(t+k)δaa(t+k) →
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−isa−iTsaa−is′ .
(15)
For example, the immediate reward Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1)
in the temporal difference error becomes
TX−i〈R〉
i
sa. The
time t gets resealed accordingly, as well.
Taking the limit K → ∞ in this way, we choose to
stay in discrete time, leaving the continuous time limit
following Refs. [18, 19, 25] for future work.
C. Three learning variants
Next, we present the deterministic limit of the tempo-
ral difference error of the three learning variants of Q,
SARSA and Actor-Critic learning. Inserting them into
Eq. 11 yields the complete description of the behavior
profile update in the deterministic limit. Table I presents
an overview of the resulting equations and a comparison
to their batch size K = 1 versions.
1. Q learning
The temporal difference error of Q learning con-
sists of three terms: (i) Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1), (ii)
maxb Q˜
i
s(t+1)b(t), and (iii) Q˜
i
s(t)a(t)(t). As already stated,
Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) → TX−i〈R〉
i
sa under K → ∞.
maxb Q˜
i
s(t+1)b(t)→ maxQisa(X), which is defined as
maxQisa(X) :=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−isa−iTsaa−is′ maxb
Qis′b(X) (16)
using the deterministic limit conversion rule (Eq. 15).
Because of the assumption of infinite interactions, we
can here replace the state-action-value approximations
7Q˜is(t+1)b with the true state-action values Q
i
s′b as defined
by Eq. 7.
For the third term, we invert Eq. 10, yielding Q˜isa(t) =
(βi)−1 logXisa(t)+const
i
s, where const
i
s is constant in ac-
tions but may vary for each agent and state. Now, one
can show that the dynamics induced by Eq. 11 are in-
variant against additive transformations in the tempo-
ral difference error TDisa(t,∞) → TDisa(t,∞) + constis.
Thus, the third term can be converted according to
Q˜is(t)a(t)(t)→ (βi)−1 logXisa(t).
All together, the temporal difference error for Q learn-
ing in the deterministic limit reads
qTDisa(t,∞) =(1− γi)TX−i〈R〉
i
sa
+ γi maxQisa(X)−
1
βi
logXisa(t). (17)
2. SARSA learning
Two of the three terms of the SARSA temporal differ-
ence error are identical to the one of Q learning, leaving
Q˜is(t+1)a(t+1)(t), which we replace by
nextQisa(X) :=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−isa−iTsaa−is′
∑
b
Xis′bQ
i
s′b(X)
(18)
using again the deterministic limit conversion rule (Eq.
15) and the state-action value Qis′b(X) of the behavior
profile X according to Eq. 7.
Thus, the temporal difference error for the SARSA
learning update in the deterministic limit reads
sarsaTDisa(t;∞) = (1− γi)TX−i〈R〉
i
sa
+ γi nextQisa(X)−
1
βi
logXisa(t). (19)
3. Actor-Critic (AC) learning
For the temporal difference error for AC learning
we have to find replacements for (i) V˜ is(t+1)(t) and (ii)
V˜ is(t)(t). Applying again Eq. 15 yields V˜
i
s(t+1)(t) →
nextVisa defined as
nextVisa :=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−isa−iTsaa−is′V
i
s′(X), (20)
using Eq. 6 for the state value V is′(X). This is the average
value of the next state given that in the current state the
agent took action a. One can show that nextVisa(X) =
nextQisa(X) from the SARSA update.
The second remaining term belongs to the slower
adaptation timescale or, in other words, occurs out-
side the batch. Thus, our deterministic limit con-
version rule (Eq. 15) does not apply. We could
think of a conversion V˜ is(t)(t) :=
∑
aX
i
saQ˜
i
s(t)a(t)(t) →
(βi)−1
∑
aX
i
sa(t) logX
i
sa(t). However, the remaining
term is constant in action, and therefore irrelevant for
the dynamics, as we have argued above. Thus, we can
simply put V˜ is(t)(t)→ 0.
All together, the temporal difference error of the Actor-
Critic learner in the deterministic limit reads
acTDisa(t,∞) =(1− γi)TX−i〈R〉
i
sa
+ γi nextVisa(X) (21)
IV. APPLICATION TO EXAMPLE
ENVIRONMENTS
In the following we apply the derived deterministic
learning equations in two different environments. Specif-
ically, we compare the three well established temporal
difference learning variants (Q learning, SARSA learn-
ing and Actor-Critic (AC) learning) in two different two-
agent (N = 2), two-action (M = 2) and two-state
(Z = 2) environments: a two-state Matching Pennies
game and a two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma. Since the
main contribution of this paper is the derivation of the
deterministic temporal difference learning equations, we
are not trying to make a case with our example environ-
ments beyond a systematic comparison of our learners.
Therefore, we chose environments that have been used
previously in related literature [33–35, 45]. Note also
that we leave a comparison between the deterministic
limit and the stochastic equations to future work, which
would add a noise term to our equations following the
example of Ref. [20].
To measure the performance of an agent’s behavior
profile in a single scalar, we use the dot product between
the stationary state distribution σ(X) of the effective
Markov Chain with the transition matrix X〈T〉 and the
behavior average reward TX〈R〉i. Interestingly, we find
this relation to be identical to the dot product of the
stationary distribution and the state value Vi(X):
σ(X) · TX〈R〉i = σ(X) ·Vi(X). (22)
This relation can be shown by using Eq. 6 and the fact
that σ(X) is an eigenvector of X〈T〉.
In the following examples we will only investigate ho-
mogeneous agents, i.e., agents whose parameters will not
differ from each other. We will therefore drop the agent
indices from αi, βi, and γi. The heterogeneous agent case
is to be explored in future work.
A. Two-state Matching Pennies
The single-state matching pennies game is a paradig-
matic two-agents, two-actions game. Imagine the situa-
tion of soccer penalty kicks. The keeper (agent 1) can
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FIG. 2: Two-state Matching Pennies. Rewards are
given in black type in the payoff tables for each state.
State-transition probabilities are indicated by (blue)
arrows.
choose to jump either to the left or right side of the goal,
and the kicker (agent 2) can choose to kick the ball also
either to the left or the right. If both agents choose the
identical side, then the keeper agent wins, otherwise the
kicker wins.
In the two-state version of the game, according to Ref.
[35], the rules are extend as follows: In state 1 the situ-
ation is as described in the single-state version. When-
ever agent 1 (the keeper) decides to jump to the left, the
environment transitions to state 2, in which the agents
switch roles: Agent 1 now plays the kicker and agent 2
the keeper. From here, whenever agent 1 (now the kicker)
decides to kick to the right side the environment transi-
tion again to state 1 and both agents switch their roles
again.
Figure 2 illustrates this two-state Matching Pennies
games. Formally, the payoff matrices are given by(
R1
111s′ ,R
2
111s′ R
1
112s′ ,R
2
112s′
R1
121s′ ,R
2
121s′ R
1
122s′ ,R
2
122s′
)
=
( 1,0 0,1
0,1 1,0
)
in state 1 and(
R1
211s′ ,R
2
211s′ R
1
212s′ ,R
2
212s′
R1
221s′ ,R
2
221s′ R
1
222s′ ,R
2
222s′
)
=
( 0,1 1,0
1,0 0,1
)
in state 2 for s′ ∈ {1, 2}. State transitions are governed
by (
T1112 T1122
T1212 T1222
)
= ( 1 10 0 ) and
(
T2111 T2121
T2211 T2221
)
= ( 0 01 1 ) .
Thus, by construction, the probability of transition-
ing to the other state is independent of agent 2’s ac-
tion. Only agent 1 has agency over the state transi-
tions. By playing a uniformly random behavior pro-
file (X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5), both agents
would obtain an average reward of 0.5 per time step.
With Fig. 3 we compare the temporal difference er-
ror in the behavior space sections for each environmental
state at a comparable low discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1) of
γ = 0.1, as well as learning trajectories for an exem-
plary initial condition for two learning rates α ∈ (0, 1),
a low one (α = 0.02) and a high one (α = 0.8). Overall,
we observe a variety of qualitatively different dynamical
regimes, such as fixed points, periodic orbits and chaotic
motion.
Specifically, we see that Q learners and SARSA learn-
ers behave qualitatively similarly in contrast to the AC
learners for both learning rates α. For the low learning
rate α = 0.02, Q and SARSA learners reach a fixed point
of playing both actions with equal probability in both
states, yielding a reward of 0.5. Due to the low α, this
takes approximately 600 time steps. In contrast, the re-
ward trajectory of the AC learner appears to be chaotic.
Figure 5 confirms this observation, which we will discuss
in more detail below.
For the high learning rate α = 0.8, both Q and SARSA
learners enter a periodic limit cycle. Differences in the
trajectories of Q and SARSA learner are clearly visible.
The time average reward of this periodic orbit appears
to be approximately 0.5 for each agent, identical to the
reward of the fixed point at lower α. The AC learner,
however, converges to a fixed point after oscillating near
the edges of the phase space. At this fixed point agent
1 plays action 1 in state 1 with probability 1. Thus, it
has trapped the system into state 2. In state 2, agent 1
plays action 2 and agent 2 plays action 1 with probabil-
ity 1 and, consequently, agent 1 receives a reward of 1,
whereas agent 2 receives 0 reward. One might ask, Why
does agent 2 not decrease their probability for playing
action 1, thereby increasing their own reward? And, in-
deed, the arrows of the temporal difference error suggest
this change of behavior profile. However, agent 2 cannot
follow because their behavior is trapped on the simplex
of nonzero action probabilities X22a. For only M = 2 ac-
tions, X221 = 1 thus can no longer change, regardless of
the temporal difference error.
Increasing the discount factor to γ = 0.9, we observe
the learning rate α to set the timescale of learning (Fig.
4). The intensity of choice remained β = 5.0. A high
learning rate α = 0.8 corresponds to faster learning in
contrast to a low learning rate α = 0.02. Also, the ratio
of learning timescales is comparable to the inverse ratio of
learning rates. For both α, Q and SARSA learners reach
a fixed point, whereas the AC learners seem to move
chaotically (details to be investigated below). Comparing
the trajectories between the learning rates α, we observe
a similar shape for each pair of learners. However, the
similarity of the AC trajectories decreases at larger time
steps.
So far, we varied two parameters: the discount factor
γ ∈ [0, 1) and the learning rate α ∈ (0, 1). Combining
Figs. 3 and 4, we investigated all four combinations of a
low and a high γ with a low and a high α. We can sum-
marize that Q and SARSA learners converge to a fixed
point for all combinations of discount factor γ and learn-
ing rate α, except when γ is low and α simultaneously
high. AC dynamics seem chaotic for all combinations of
α and γ.
To investigate the relationship between the parameters
more thoroughly, Fig. 5 shows bifurcation diagrams with
the bifurcation parameters α and γ. Additionally, it also
gives the largest Lyapunov exponents for each learner and
each parameter combination. A largest Lyapunov expo-
nent greater than zero is a key characteristic of chaotic
motion. We computed the Lyapunov exponent from the
9FIG. 3: Three learners in two-state Matching Pennies environment for low discount factor γ = 0.1;
intensity of choice β = 5.0. At the top, the temporal difference errors for the Q learner (Eq. 17), SARSA learner
(Eq. 19 ) and Actor-Critic (AC) learner (Eq. 21) are shown in two behavior phase-space sections, one for each state.
The arrows indicate the average direction the temporal difference errors drive the learner toward, averaged over all
phase-space points of the other state. Arrow colors (and shadings) additionally encode their lengths. Selected
trajectories are shown in the phase-space sections, as well as by reward trajectories, plotting the average reward
value (Eq. 22) over time steps. Crosses in the phase-space subsections indicate the initial behavior
(X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.01, 0.99, 0.3, 0.4). Circles signal the arrival at a fixed point, determined by the absolute
difference of behavior profiles between two subsequent time steps being below  = 10−6. Trajectories are shown for
two different learning rates α = 0.02 (light red) and α = 0.8 (dark blue). The bold reward trajectory belongs to
agent 1 and the thin one to agent 2. Note that the temporal difference error is independent from the learning rate α.
A variety of qualitatively different dynamical regimes can be observed.
FIG. 4: Two-state Matching Pennies environment for high discount factor γ = 0.9; otherwise identical to Fig.
3.
analytically derived Jacobian matrix, iteratively used in a
QR decomposition according to Ref. [46]. See Appendix
A for details.
The largest Lyapunov exponent for Q and SARSA
learners align almost perfectly with each other, whereas
the largest Lyapunov exponent of the AC learners be-
haves qualitatively different. We first describe the behav-
ior of the Q and SARSA learner: For high learning rates
α and low farsightedness γ, Fig. 5 shows a periodic orbit
with few (four) points in phase space. Largest Lyapunov
exponents are distinctly below 0 at those regimes. In-
creasing the farsightedness γ both learners enter a regime
10
FIG. 5: Varying discount factor γ and learning
rate α in two-state Matching Pennies
environment for intensity of choice β = 5.0 for the Q
learners (green crosses), the SARSA learners (blue dots)
and the Actor-Critic (AC) learners (red triangles). On
the left, the discount factor γ is varied with learning
rate α = 0.8, as indicated by the gray vertical lines on
the right. On the right, the learning rate α is varied
with discount factor γ = 0.1 as indicated by the gray
vertical lines on the left. The three top panels show the
visited behavior points during 1000 iterations after a
transient period of 100 000 time steps from initial
behavior (X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.01, 0.99, 0.3, 0.4).
Visited points are mapped to the function
8X221 + 4X
1
21 + 2X
2
11 +X
1
11 on the vertical axes to give a
fuller image of the visited behavior profiles. The bottom
panel shows the corresponding largest Lyapunov
exponents for the three learners. Overall, Q and
SARSA learner behave qualitatively more similarly
than the Actor-Critic learner.
of visiting many points in phase space around the stable
fixed point (X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5). The
largest Lyapuonv exponents are close to zero. With in-
creasing γ the distance around this fixed-point solution
decreases until the dynamics converge from a farsighted-
ness γ slightly greater than 0.5 onward. From there the
largest Lyapunov exponent decreases again for further
increasing γ. The same observations can be made along
a decreasing bifurcation parameter α, except that at the
end, for low α, the largest Lyapunov exponents do not
FIG. 6: Varying intensity of choice β under
constant α · β in two-state Matching Pennies
environment for discount factor γ = 0.9. On the left
trajectories of the three learners (Q: green dashed,
SARSA: blue straight, Actor-Critic(AC): red dotted)
are shown in the two behavior space sections, one for
each state. On the right, the corresponding reward
trajectories are shown. The initial behavior was
(X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.01, 0.99, 0.3, 0.4). The bold
reward trajectory belongs to agent 1 and the thin one
to agent 2. One observes the deterministic limit of
Actor-Critic learning to be invariant under constant
α · β and SARSA learning to converge to AC learning
under β →∞.
decrease as distinctly as for high γ.
The behavior of the Actor-Critic dynamics is quali-
tatively different from the one of Q and SARSA. The
placement of the fixed points on the natural numbers
grid suggests that the AC learner get confined on one of
the 16 (MNZ) corners of the behavior phase space. No
regularity to which fixed point the AC learner converges
can be deduced. The largest Lyapunov exponent is al-
ways above zero and experiences an overall decreasing
behavior. Similarly, for a decreasing bifurcation param-
eter α, the largest Lyapunov exponent tends to decrease
as well. Different from the bifurcation diagram along γ,
for low α the system might enter a periodic motion, but
only for some parameters α. No regularity can be de-
termined at which parameters α the AC learners enter a
periodic motion. A more thorough investigation of the
nonlinear dynamics, especially those of the Actor-Critic
learner, seems of great interest but is, however, beyond
the scope of this article and leaves promising paths for
future work.
Concerning the parameter β, the intensity of choice,
one can infer from the update equations (Eq. 11 com-
bined with Eq. 19 and Eq. 21) that the dynamics for
the AC learner are invariant for a constant product αβ.
This is because the temporal difference error of the Actor-
Critic learner in the deterministic limit is independent of
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FIG. 7: Two-state Prisoners Dilemma. Rewards
are given in black type in the payoff tables for each
state. State-transition probabilities are indicated by
(blue) arrows.
β. Further, the dynamics of the SARSA learner will con-
verge to the dynamics of the AC learner under β → ∞.
Figure 6 nicely confirms these two observations. Observ-
ing Table I is another way to see this. Since the value
estimate of the future state is identical for SARSA and
AC learning, letting the value estimate of the current
state vanish by sending β →∞ makes the SARSA learn-
ers approximate the AC learners.
As mentioned before, β controls the exploration-
exploitation trade-off. In the temporal difference er-
rors of the Q and SARSA learner it appears in the
term indicating the value estimate of the current state
−1/βi log(Xisa). If this term dominates the tempo-
ral difference error (i.e., if β is small), then the learn-
ers tend toward the center of behavior space, i.e.,
(X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5), forgetting what
they have learned about the obtainable reward. This
characteristic happens to be favorable in our two-
state Matching Pennies environment, which is why Q
and SARSA learners perform better in finding the
(X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) solution. On
the other hand, if β is large, then the temporal difference
error is dominated by the current reward and future value
estimate. Not being able to forget, the learners might get
trapped in unfavorable behavior, as we can see observ-
ing the Actor-Critic learners. To calibrate β it is useful
to make oneself clear that it must come in units of [log
behavior] / [reward].
B. Two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma
The single state Prisoners Dilemma is another paradig-
matic two-agents, two-actions game. It has been used to
model social dilemmas and study the emergence of coop-
eration. It describes a situation in which two prisoners
are separately interrogated, leaving them with the choice
to either cooperate with each other by not speaking to
the police or defecting by testifying.
The two-state version, which has been used as a test
environment also in Refs. [33–35], extends this situation
somewhat artificially by playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma in
each of the two states with a transition probability of
10% from one state to the other if both agents chose the
same action, and a transition probability of 90% if both
agents chose opposite actions.
Figure 7 illustrates these game dynamics. Formally,
the payoff matrices are given by(
R1
111s′ ,R
2
111s′ R
1
112s′ ,R
2
112s′
R1
121s′ ,R
2
121s′ R
1
122s′ ,R
2
122s′
)
=
( 3,3 0,10
10,0 2,2
)
in state 1 and(
R1
211s′ ,R
2
211s′ R
1
212s′ ,R
2
212s′
R1
221s′ ,R
2
221s′ R
1
222s′ ,R
2
222s′
)
=
( 4,4 0,10
10,0 1,1
)
in state 2 for s′ ∈ {1, 2}, respectively. The corresponding
state transition probabilities are given by(
T1112 T1122
T1212 T1222
)
=
(
T2111 T2121
T2211 T2221
)
= ( 0.1 0.90.9 0.1 ) .
To be precise, the rewards in each state do not resem-
ble a classical social dilemma situation. This is because if
both agents would alternately cooperate and defect, both
could receive a larger reward per time step compared to
always cooperating. Hence, this stochastic game, as it
was used in Refs. [33–35], presents more a coordination
than a cooperation challenge to the agents. The mul-
tistate environment can here function as a coordination
device.
A behavior profile in which one agent exploits the other
in one state, while being exploited in the other state,
would result in an average reward per time step of 5 for
each agent, e.g., (X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0, 1, 1, 0).
However, for all three learning types with a mid-ranged
farsightedness (γ = 0.45) and an intensity of choice
β = 5.0, the temporal difference error arrows are point-
ing on average toward the lower left defection-defection
point for each state in behavior phase space (Fig. 8). To
see whether the three learning types may converge to the
described defect-cooperate-cooperate-defect equilibrium,
individual trajectories from two exemplary initial condi-
tions and for two learning rates α are shown, a small one
(α = 0.02) and a high one (α = 0.8).
We observe qualitatively different behavior across all
three learners. The Q learners converge to equilibria
with average rewards distinctly below 5, and the SARSA
learners converge to equilibira with average rewards of
almost 5 for both learning rates α and both exemplary
initial conditions. Both Q and SARSA learners con-
verge to solutions of proper probabilistic behavior, i.e.,
choosing action cooperate and action defect with nonva-
nishing chance. The Actor-Critic learners, on the other
hand, converge to the deterministic defect-cooperate-
cooperate-defect behavior described above for the initial
condition shown with the non-dashed lines in Fig. 8 for
both learning rates α (shown in light red and dark blue).
For the other exemplary initial condition, shown with the
dashed lines, it converges to an all-defection solution in
both states for both α.
Interestingly, for all learners, all combinations of initial
conditions and learning rates converge to a fixed point
solution, except for the Q learners with a comparably
high learning rate α = 0.8, which enter a periodic behav-
ior solution for the initial condition with the nondashed
12
FIG. 8: Two-state Prisoners Dilemma environment for discount factor γ = 0.45; otherwise identical to Fig. 3.
line. The same phenomenon occurred also in the Match-
ing Pennies environment for low farsightedness γ = 0.1,
however, there for both Q and SARSA learners. It seems
to be caused by the comparably high learning rate. A
high learning rate overshoots the behavior update, re-
sulting in a circling behavior around the fixed point. As
in Fig. 3, the time average reward of the periodic orbit
seems to be comparable to the reward of the correspond-
ing fixed point at lower α. Furthermore, we observe the
same time rescaling effect of the learning rate α in Figure
8 as in Fig. 4.
To visualize the influence of the discount factor γ
on the converged behavior, Fig. 9 shows a bifurca-
tion diagram along the bifurcation parameter γ for two
initial conditions. Pluses in blue result from a uni-
formly random behavior profile of (X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) =
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5), whereas the crosses in red initially
started from the behavior profile (X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) =
(0.51, 0.49, 0.49, 0.51).
Across all learners, lower discount factors γ correspond
to all-defect solutions, whereas for higher γ the solu-
tions from the initial condition shown with red crosses
tend toward the cooperate-defect-defect-cooperate solu-
tion. For low γ, the agents are less aware of the pres-
ence of other states and find the all-defect equilibrium
solution of the iterated normal form Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The state transition probabilities have less effect on the
learning dynamics. Only above a certain farsightedness
do the agents find the more rewarding cooperate-defect-
defect-cooperate solution.
The observation from Fig. 8 is confirmed that the prob-
ability to cooperate (i.e., here X111 and X
2
21 ) is lowest for
the Q learners, midrange for the SARSA learners and 1
for the Actor-Critic learners. One reason for this observa-
tion can be found in the intensity of choice parameter β.
It balances the reward obtainable in the current behavior
space segment with the forgetting of current knowledge
to be open to new solutions. Such forgetting expresses
itself by temporal difference error components pointing
toward the center of behavior space. Thus, a relatively
small β = 5.0 can explain why solutions at the edge of
the behavior space cannot be reached by Q and SARSA
learners. The AC learner misses this forgetting term in
the deterministic limit and can therefore easily enter be-
havior profiles at the edge of the behavior space.
Q and SARSA learners have a critical discount fac-
tor γ above which the cooperate-defect-defect-cooperate
high reward solution is obtained and below which the
all-defect low reward solution gets selected. However,
for increasing discount factors γ up to 1, Q and SARSA
learners experience a drop in playing the cooperative ac-
tion probability.
The Actor-Critic learners approach the cooperate-
defect-defect-cooperate solution in two steps. For in-
creasing γ, first the probability of agent 2 cooperating
in state 2 (X221) jumps from zero to 1 while agent 1 still
defects in state 1. Only after a slight increase of γ does
agent 1 also cooperate in state 1 (X111).
Interestingly, for the uniformly random initial behav-
ior condition shown with blue pluses, there is no criti-
cal discount factor γ and no learners come close to the
cooperate-defect-defect-cooperate solution. Here, only
for γ close to 1 do all cooperation probabilities Xis1
gradually increase. Furthermore, exactly at those γ,
where the cooperate-defect-defect-cooperate solution is
obtained from the initial behavior condition shown with
red crosses, the solutions from the uniformly random ini-
tial behavior condition (blue pluses) have a largest Lya-
puonv exponent greater than 0. At other values of γ,
the largest Lyapunov exponents for the two initial con-
ditions overlap. This suggests that the largest Lyapunov
exponents greater than zero may point to the fact that
other, perhaps more rewarding solutions may exist in
phase space. A more thorough investigation regarding
this multistability is an open point for future research.
As we have argued above, the two-state Prisoner’s
13
FIG. 9: Varying discount factor γ in two-state Prisoners Dilemma environment for learning rate α = 0.2
and intensity of choice β = 5.0 for the Q learners on the left, the SARSA learners in the middle and the Actor-Critic
learners on the right. The four top panels for each learner show the visited behavior points X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21
during 1000 iterations after a transient period of 5000 time steps from initial behavior
(X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) in blue pluses and from initial behavior
(X111, X
2
11, X
1
21, X
2
21) = (0.51, 0.49, 0.49, 0.51) in red crosses. The bottom panels show the corresponding largest
Lyapunov exponents for the two initial conditions. Above a critical discount factor γ all learners find the high
rewarding solution from the red crosses initial condition, but do not do so from the blue pluses initial condition.
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FIG. 10: Cooperation challenge in a two-state
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Top panel shows a two-state
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, whose state games
individually favor defection. Bottom panels shows the
level of cooperation SARSA learners with α = 0.016,
β = 250 play after reaching a fixed point from the
center of behavior space (Xisa = 0.5 for all i, s, a) for
varying discount factors γ. Results for Q and AC
learners are similar. Cooperation levels are shown for
the full stochastic game as well as for each individual
state game played repeatedly. For sufficiently large
farsightedness, cooperation can emerge in the stochastic
game, in contrast to the individual repeated games.
Dilemma as it was used in Refs. [33–35] presents rather a
coordination than a cooperation challenge to the agents.
Figure 10 demonstrates that our learning dynamics are
also capable of solving a cooperation challenge in a
stochastic game setting, for which we adapt a two-state
Prisoner’s Dilemma in analogy to Ref. [45]. Figure 10
confirms previous findings that cooperation emerges only
in the stochastic game, compared to playing each Pris-
oner’s Dilemma repeatedly [45]. Further, cooperation
only emerges for sufficiently large farsightedness γ.
V. DISCUSSION
The main contribution of this paper is the develop-
ment of a technique to obtain the deterministic limit
of temporal difference reinforcement learning. Through
our work we have combined the literature on learning
dynamics from statistical physics with the evolutionary
game theory-inspired learning dynamics literature from
machine learning. For the statistical physics community,
the novelty consists of learning equations, capable of han-
dling environmental state transitions. For the machine
learning community the novelty lies in the systematic
methodology we have used to obtain the deterministic
learning equations.
We have demonstrated our approach with the three
prominent reinforcement learning algorithms from com-
puter science: Q learning, SARSA learning, and Actor-
Critic learning. A comparison of their dynamics in pre-
viously used two-agent, two-actions, two-states environ-
ments has revealed the existence of a variety of qualita-
tively different dynamical regimes, such as convergence
to fixed points, periodic orbits and deterministic chaos.
We have found that Q and SARSA learners tend
to behave qualitatively more similar in comparison to
the Actor-Critic learning dynamics. This characteris-
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tic results at least partly from our relatively low inten-
sity of choice parameter β, controlling the exploration-
exploitation trade-off via a forgetting term in the tempo-
ral difference errors. Sending β →∞, the SARSA learn-
ing dynamics approach the Actor-Critic learning dynam-
ics, as we have shown. Overall the Actor-Critic learn-
ers have a tendency to enter confining behavior profiles,
due to their nonexisting forgetting term. This charac-
teristic leaves them trapped at the edges of the behavior
space. In contrast, Q and SARSA learner do not show
such learning behavior. Interestingly, this characteristic
of the AC learners turns out to be favorable in the two-
state Prisoner’s Dilemma environment, where they find
the most rewarding solution in more cases compared to
Q and SARSA but hinders the convergence to the fixed
point solution in the two-state Matching Pennies envi-
ronment. Thus, the most favorable level of forgetting
depends on the environment. In order to tune the respec-
tive parameter β, our consideration that it must come in
the unit of [log behavior] / [reward] may be helpful.
We have demonstrated the effect of the learning rate α
adjusting the speed of learning by controlling the amount
of new information used in a behavior profile update.
Thereby, within limits, α functions as a time rescaling.
However, a comparably large learning rate α might cause
an overshooting phenomenon, hindering the convergence
to a fixed point. Instead, the learners enter a limit cy-
cle around that point. Nevertheless, the average reward
of the limit-cycling behavior was approximately equal to
the one of the fixed point obtained at lower α but took
fewer time steps to reach. Thus, perhaps other dynamical
regimes than fixed points, such as limit cycles or strange
attractors, could be of interest in some applications of
reinforcement learning.
We have also shown the effect of the discount factor
γ adjusting the farsightedness of the agents. At low γ
the state transition probabilities have less effect on the
learning dynamics compared to high discount factors.
To summarize the three parameters α, β, and γ: The
level of exploitation β and the farsightedness γ con-
trol where the learner adapts toward in behavior space,
weighting current reward, expected future reward and
the level of forgetting. The learning rate α controls how
fast the learner adapts along these directions.
We hope that our work might turn out useful for the
application of reinforcement learning in various domains,
with respect to parameter tuning, the design of new al-
gorithms, and the analysis of complex strategic interac-
tions using meta strategies, as Bloembergen et al. [28]
have pointed out. In this regard, future work could ex-
tend the presented methodology to partial observability
of the Markov states of the environment [40, 41], be-
havior profiles with history, and other-regarding agent
(i.e. joint-action) learners (cf. Ref. [2] for an overview
of other-regarding agent learning algorithms). Also, the
combination of individual reinforcement learning and so-
cial learning through imitation [47–50] seems promising.
Such endeavors would naturally lead to the exploration of
network effects. It is important to note that only a few
dynamical systems reinforcement learning studies have
begun to incorporate network structures between agents
[22, 23].
Apart from these more technical extensions, we hope
that our learning equations will prove themselves useful
when studying the evolution of cooperation in stochastic
games [45]. With stochastic games one is able to explic-
itly account for a changing environment. Therefore, such
studies are likely to contribute to the advancement of
theoretical research on the sustainability of interlinked
social-ecological systems [51, 52]. Interactions, syner-
gies, and trade-offs between social [13, 53] and ecological
[54] dilemmas can be explored using the framework of
stochastic games. More realistic environments, modeling
e.g., the harvesting of common-pool renewable resources
[55, 56] or the prevention of dangerous climate change
[57, 58], for our learning dynamics are likely to prove
themselves useful. Here, it may be of interest to evaluate
the learning process not only in terms of efficiency but
also how close it came to the optimal behavior. Other
paradigms than value optimization may also be impor-
tant [59], such as sustainability or resilience [60].
Python code to reproduce the figures of this article is available
at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1495091.
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Appendix A: Computation of Lyapunov Exponents
We compute the Lyapunov exponents using an iterative QR decomposition of the Jacobian matrix according to Sandri [46]. In the
following we present the derivation of the Jacobian matrix.
Eq. 11 constitutes a map f , which iteratively updates the behavior profile X ∈ RN×M×Z . Consequently, we can represent its derivative
as a Jacobian tensor f ′(X) ∈ RN×M×Z×N×M×Z .
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Let Aisa := X
i
sa exp
(
αiβiTDisa(X)
)
be the numerator of Eq. 11, and Bis :=
∑
b A
i
sb its denominator, i.e. f =: A/B. Hence,
f ′(X) =
A′B −B′A
B2
(A1)
or, more precisely, in components,
df isa(X)
dXjrb
=
dAisa(X)
dX
j
rb
Bis(X)− dB
i
s
dX
j
rb
(X)Aisa(X)
(Bis(X))
2
. (A2)
A and B are known, and if A′ is known, then B′ is easily obtained by dB
i
s(X)
dX
j
rb
=
∑
c
dAisc(X)
dX
j
rb
. Therefore we need to compute A′ for
the three learner types Q, SARSA and Actor-Critic learning.
1. Q learning
Let us rewrite Aisa for the Q learner according to
Aisa := (X
i
sa)
(1−αi) exp
(
αiβiTˆD
i
sa(X)
)
, (A3)
where we removed the estimate of the current value from the temporal difference error, leaving the truncated TD error as
TˆD
i
sa(X) := (1− γi)TX−i 〈R〉
i
sa + γ
i maxQisa(X). (A4)
Hence, we can write the derivative of A as
dAisa(X)
dXjrb
= exp
(
αiβiTˆD
i
sa(X)
)(
(1− αi)(Xisa)−α
i dXisa
dXjrb
+ αiβi(Xisa)
(1−αi) dTˆD
i
sa(X)
dXjrb
)
. (A5)
Since
∑
cX
i
sc = 1, dX
i
sa/dX
j
rb can be expressed as
dXisa
dXjrb
= δijδsr(2δab − 1). (A6)
The derivative of the truncated temporal difference error reads
dTˆD
i
sa(X)
dXjrb
= (1− γi)
d
TX−i
〈R〉isa
dXjrb
+ γi
dmaxQisa(X)
dXjrb
. (A7)
Let us write the derivative of the reward as
d
TX−i
〈R〉isa
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′R
i
saa−is′ (A8)
using Eq. 2 and Eq. 3, where the derivatives dX−i
sa−i/dX
j
rb need to be executed according to Eq. A6.
For the derivative of the maximum next value we write accordingly
dmaxQisa(X)
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′ maxc
Qis′c(X) +
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′
dmaxcQis′c(X)
dXjrb
. (A9)
Let am := arg maxaQisa(X), then
dmaxcQisc(X)
dXjrb
= δaam
dQisa(X)
dXjrb
(A10)
and
dQisa(X)
dXjrb
= (1− γi)
d
TX−i
〈R〉isa
dXjrb
+ γi
∑
s′
dX〈T 〉ss′
dXjrb
V is′ (X) + X〈T 〉ss′
dV i
s′ (X)
dXjrb
. (A11)
For the derivative of the effective Markov Chain transition tensor we can write
dX〈T 〉ss′
dXjrb
=
∑
a
dXsa
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′ , (A12)
using Eqs. 2 and 3, where again the derivatives dXsa/dX
j
rb need to be executed according to Eq. A6.
For the derivative of the state value let us rewrite Eq. 6 as V is = (1− γi)
∑
s′M
−1
ss′ TX〈R〉is′ with M := (1Z − γi X〈T 〉). Thus,
dV is (X)
dXjrb
= (1− γi)
∑
s′′
d(M−1
ss′′ )
dXjrb
TX〈R〉is′′ +M−1ss′′
dTX〈R〉is′′
dXjrb
. (A13)
To obtain the derivative of the inverse matrix M−1 we use (M−1M)′ = 0 = (M−1)′M + M−1M ′ and therefore (M−1)′ =
−M−1M ′M−1. For M ′ we write,
dMss′
dXjrb
= −γi dX〈T 〉ss′
dXjrb
. (A14)
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We obtain the derivative of the reward according to
dTX〈R〉is
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a
dXsa
dXjrb
Tsas′R
i
sas′ , (A15)
using Eq. 1 and Eq. 3, where the derivatives dXisa/dX
j
rb need to be executed according to Eq. A6.
Now we can compute the Jacobian matrix for the Q learning dynamics in their deterministic limit.
2. SARSA learning
The computation of the Jacobian matrix for the SARSA learning update in its deterministic limit is similar, except the truncated
temporal difference error reads
TˆD
i
sa(X) := (1− γi)TX−i 〈R〉
i
sa + γ
i nextQisa(X). (A16)
instead of Eq. A4. Hence,
dTˆD
i
sa(X)
dXjrb
= (1− γi)
d
TX−i
〈R〉isa
dXjrb
+ γi
d nextQisa(X)
dXjrb
, (A17)
and
d nextQisa(X)
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′
∑
c
Xis′cQ
i
s′c(X) +
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′
d[
∑
cX
i
s′cQ
i
s′c(X)]
dXjrb
. (A18)
The derivative of
∑
cX
i
s′cQ
i
s′c(X) reads
d[
∑
cX
i
s′cQ
i
s′c(X)]
dXjrb
=
∑
c
(
dXi
s′c
dXjrb
Qis′c(X) +X
i
s′c
dQi
s′c
dXjrb
)
. (A19)
All remaining terms have already been given in the previous section for the Q learner Jacobian matrix.
3. Actor-Critic learning
For the Actor-Critic learning update, Eq. A3 reads
Aisa := X
i
sa exp
(
αiβiTˆD
i
sa(X)
)
, (A20)
with the truncated temporal difference error
TˆD
i
sa(X) := (1− γi)TX−i 〈R〉
i
sa + γ
i nextVisa(X). (A21)
The derivative of the next value estimate is obtained by
d nextVisa(X)
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′V
i
s′ (X) +
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′
dV i
s′ (X)
dXjrb
. (A22)
The derivative of the next value V i
s′ is given by Eq. A13. These are all terms necessary to compute the Jacobian matrix for the Actor-Critic
learning update.
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